Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) have claimed that the world income distribution underwent a 'Reversal of Fortune' from 1500 to the present, whereby formerly rich countries in what is now the developing world became poor while poor ones grew rich. We question their analysis with regard to both of their proxies for pre-modern income, namely urbanization and population density. More specifically, an alternative measure of urbanization with more observations generates a positive (but not significant) correlation between pre-modern and contemporary income, while a better measure of population density on arable land no longer produces a robust relationship.
Introduction
In a seminal paper Acemoglu et al. (2002) argue that countries in the developing world have experienced a 'Reversal of Fortune,' whereby those that were previously rich in the precolonial era have become poor, while those that were poor are now rich. Rather than explaining this reversal through geographic factors, they claim that different sets of institutions imposed by colonial rule resulted in differing patterns of industrialization over the past two hundred years, and that this phenomenon happened across the colonial world, regardless of the nature of the colonial power. Their thesis has drawn a great deal of attention due to its strong emphasis on European colonial rule as the major explanation for divergence in the modern world income distribution.
Naturally the biggest problem with any analysis of long-term income trends is the lack of accurate data on pre-modern income levels. Acemoglu et al. (2002) (henceforth AJR) proxy for pre-modern income in two ways, namely urbanization and population density. In both cases they argue that a higher value represents a higher aggregate income inasmuch as only societies with high incomes could support urban and dense populations. 1 In this paper, however, we question their data for these two proxies of pre-colonial income. First, their measure of urbanization contains no data from Africa and thus consists of only 41 observations; when we use an alternative measure of urbanization with 71 observations from Africa and the Americas the relationship disappears and even changes sign. Second, despite their claims to the contrary, their data on population density does not properly account for arable land, and, when corrected with better data, their results collapse across a number of econometric specifications. We use standard Ordinary Least Squares regression approaches as done by AJR.
We therefore not only suggest that AJR's analysis does not hold on a global scale but offer two specific reasons for this result. First, in no specifications do the data show a reversal within Africa, thereby suggesting that Africa's poverty was largely untouched by colonialism. Secondly, their results are largely driven by the four Neo-Europes, which, when excluded, render the relationship between pre-colonial income and contemporary GDP per capita either weakly significant or not significant. Thus, while we do not rule out a 'Reversal of Fortune' among select countries, our results suggest that whatever reversal took place was not a generalized phenomenon.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the differences between AJR's data on urbanization and population density and ours. In Section 3 we present our new empirical results of regressing contemporary income levels on these two proxies of premodern incomes. We then offer an interpretation of the results in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 Description of the Data
Urbanization
The first proxy used by AJR for income in 1500 is urbanization, or more specifically the percentage of a given population living in cities. They use data on urbanization from Bairoch (1988) and Eggimann (1999) by supplementing Bairoch (1988) 's data on cities greater than 5000 people with Eggimann (1999)'s estimates of cities larger than 20,000 people and then converting Eggimann (1999)'s data to a 5000-person minimum. They claim in an earlier version that 5000 people is a much better threshold as it accounts for a greater number of small pre-modern cities (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001 ; Appendix A: 1).
However, it is no accident that both Chandler (1987) and Eggimann (1999) only list data on pre-modern cities greater than 20,000 people as the data on pre-modern urbanization in the developing world is remarkably poor. Indeed, Bairoch (1988: 520) himself notes that 'given the current state of data and research, it is impossible in the case of most countries to assemble figures on urban population sufficiently complete to give a valid indication of the population of all cities with more than five thousand;' he indicated that his future efforts would be directed at lowering the population threshold to 8000 people for Europe. 2 Historians agree that data on small ancient cities can be inaccurate for the reasons that abandoned cities can disappear over time, migration routes can make it difficult to measure cities' permanent populations and much archaeological work on ancient cities in the tropics remains to be done (Connah, 2001; Hopkins, 2009 Berry (1961) and Long (2005) , among others. Moreover, using Chandler (1987) as our source has several advantages. First, unlike AJR's use of both Bairoch (1988) and Eggimann (1999) , all of our data originates from a single source. Second, by using data directly from its source we avoid the need to convert it and thereby open ourselves to criticism of the conversion process. 3 Third and finally, this data allows us to include data on Africa in 1500 in our regressions.
While AJR decided to exclude African data because they claim that it was not 'detailed' enough (Acemoglu et al., : 1238 
Population Density
The second proxy used by AJR for pre-modern income is population density. For their data AJR calculate population density on arable land for the simple reason that including non-arable land would make pre-modern states like ancient Egypt appear very thinly populated and thus not very rich. They take their data on arable land from McEvedy and Jones (1978) , with the claim that doing so 'excludes primarily desert, inland water and tundra' (Acemoglu et al., : 1243 .
However, while McEvedy and Jones (1978) sometimes present data on arable land for various countries, in 86 of the 91 observations used by AJR they list no data on arable land, leading AJR to assume all land as arable for these observations. Yet this assumption is highly problematic in a large number of countries like Australia, Botswana and Canada which have large tracts of noncultivable frozen tundra, deserts and mountains.
To correct for this error we employ here data from the FAO (2000) One concern with this data is that it does not account for soil erosion since 1500. However, evidence suggests that soil erosion is more a consequence of the use of non-arable land, in particular land with steep slopes and low nutrient levels, than a cause of non-arability (FAO, 2000: 33; Pimentel et al., 1995 Pimentel et al., : 1117 Pimentel et al., -1118 . Moreover, even if we assume that erosion and degradation did lead to significant changes over time in arability, the FAO (2000: 28) shows that soils have suffered more erosion in Africa, Asia and South America than in North America and Australasia.
According to this logic there may have been even more PAL in 1500 in Africa, Asia and South America than today, which would mean lower densities in 1500 in those areas claimed by AJR to have been the richest regions in the world at the time. In other words, better historical data on land arability would most likely only add further evidence against the Reversal thesis. 6 We can see the differences between select countries estimated by AJR as having 100% of their land as arable and the FAO data in Table 1 . The disparities are stark, especially in the NeoEuropes and Africa. In fact, the FAO's estimates of PAL may be overly generous in some cases.
For instance, the Canada Land Directory grades soil quality from level 1 to level 7, where levels 1-4 are suitable for permanent agriculture land, levels 5 and 6 are suitable for grazing and level 7 is land unsuitable for agriculture; it estimates that only 10.3% of Canada's land falls within levels 1-5, and only 5.0% within levels 1-3 (Canada Land Inventory, 1976) . Similarly, the Botswanan Ministry of Agriculture estimated only 5.2% of its land to be cultivable in the 1970s, with only 1% of land under cultivation at any one point (Alverson, 1984) . Thus, in at least these two cases, EPAL is a better measure of cultivable land than PAL.
[Insert Table 1 and 810,000 Km2 from El-Farouk (1996) and Kaikati (1980) , respectively, than the mere 300,000 km2 calculated by McEvedy and Jones (1978) . 8 
Empirical Analysis
With these new data on urbanization and arable land we can now re-estimate AJR's models. We should note, however, several changes to the dataset. First, eight Caribbean countries included in the AJR paper could not be included here due to a lack of data on potential arable land, namely the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Trinidad and Tobago. AJR also lack data on population densities for these countries, but assume that they have the same population density as the Dominican Republic (Acemoglu et al., : 1289 Third, inasmuch as the 'Reversal of Fortune' argument involves the transition from precolonial occupation to colonial domination and then post-colonial independence, we exclude three countries included in AJR which should not have been in their analysis, namely Cape Verde (which had no human occupants prior to colonization) and Ethiopia and Nepal (neither of which were colonized by Europeans). Using the same logic we also added two countries which were colonized by Europeans after 1500 but which lie in the Mediterranean, namely Cyprus (under UK administration 1878-1960) and Malta (UK administration, 1814 (UK administration, -1964 . 12 Our data is listed in Appendix 1, with descriptive statistics for our variables in Appendix 2. Having noted these changes, however, it should be noted that all results presented in this paper do not substantially change when using AJR's original sample of countries (results obtainable from authors).
We also use three geographical controls in our analysis, namely average latitude, average distance to coastline and average elevation per country, which are similar to the control variables used by AJR. 13 
Urbanization
In Figures 1 and 2 we plot log GDP per capita in 1995 against the urbanization variable used by AJR and our new urbanization variable, CHANDLER, respectively. In Figure 1 , the OLS fit suggests a negative relationship between the two variables. However, in Figure 2 , the OLS fit suggests a positive relationship with a poor fit.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here]
In Table 2 , we present the results for OLS regressions of log GDP per capita (PPP) in 1995 on urbanization. The basic model we estimate is:
where GDP i is log GDP per capita (PPP) in 1995 for country i, Urbanization i is the Chandler urbanization estimate for country i and έ i is an error term assumed to be normally distributed. In
Panel A we present the results with the full sample and the continent sub-samples. The first column records the result with the urbanization variable used by AJR, yielding a negative and significant coefficient. In column 2 (and all columns hereafter) we use the Chandler urbanization variable and find that the urbanization coefficient is positive and no longer significant in our full sample. In column 3 we re-run the regression after dropping observations with urbanization equal to zero and find a positive and significant relationship. This result suggests that, for those countries which had some level of urbanization in 1500, there exists a positive relationship between income per-capita in 1500 and 1995, albeit one which is not robust to our three geographical controls (not reported here).
[Insert Table 2 here]
When we split the sample by continents, as also done by AJR, we obtain different results for each continent group. We find that the relationship remains significant for the Africa sub-sample (column 4), although this result is not significant upon adding geographical controls (not reported here). Column 5 demonstrates a weakly significant and negative coefficient in the sample excluding Africa; however, as before the coefficient is not significant after the controls are added (also not reported). We also present results in columns 6-9 for sub-samples excluding the NeoEuropes (Canada and the US only, as our data does not include Australia and New Zealand), and for sub-samples of former French, Spanish and British colonies. We obtain a weakly positive and significant relationship between urbanization and log GDP for the sample excluding the NeoEuropes, and an insignificant relationship in all other sub-samples. We also test for a sub-sample of former British colonies excluding the two Neo-Europes (not reported here), with similar results. Thus, in using the Chandler definition of urbanization we observe that the 'Reversal of Fortune' result obtained by AJR does not hold. To summarize our findings:
• The relationship between urbanization and log GDP per capita is not significant for the (African and American) full sample and all but one sub-sample.
• The relationship is positive and significant for the sub-samples excluding zero values of urbanization and for our Africa sub-sample. However, this result is not robust to the inclusion of geographical controls.
• These results hold whether we include or exclude the 18 cities listed by Chandler (1987) that do not have population figures.
Population Density
In this section we observe the relationship between population density and log GDP. The results obtained here are mixed compared to what we obtained using the urbanization variable.
The following figures plot log GDP per capita in 1995 against log population density in 1500; first, in Figure 3 for population density variable used by AJR, and in Figure 4 for our new population density variable, PAL. We observe a clear negative relationship in Figure 3 . However, in Figure 4 , while the plot generates a similar negative sloping OLS fit, it appears to be driven by specific data points. To isolate the effects of certain countries, we will therefore not just test for the relationship using the full sample data, but also by using sub-samples of countries, as described below.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 here]
We estimate OLS regressions of log GDP per capita (PPP) in 1995 on our new population density variables. The basic model we estimate is:
where GDP i is log GDP per capita (PPP) in 1995 for country i, PopulationDensity i is the population density estimate for country i and έ i is an error term assumed to be normally distributed. Table 3 presents the results for the continent specific sub-samples and the former colony sub-samples. In Panel A columns 1 and 2 present the results with the AJR definition of population density and the FAO-corrected definition of population density, respectively. While in both cases there is a negative and significant relationship, the size of the coefficient for the FAO population density variable is less than half of the coefficient of the AJR variable. Moreover, the goodness of fit (the R 2 ) of the FAO variable regression is 0.09, or only one quarter the size of the 0.35 R 2 obtained in the original AJR regression. Column 3 presents the results with the FAO variable and geography controls, and the relationship remains negative and significant. However, the following sub-samples obtain mixed results. While the coefficient is negative and strongly significant for the sample without Africa (column 4), it is not significant for only Africa (column 5). For the sample without the Americas in column 6 the relationship is again not significant, and barely significant for the sample with only the Americas (Column 7).
[Insert Table 3 here]
In Panel B we present the regressions with the former colony sub-samples. While AJR find that for the sample excluding the four Neo-Europes results in a significant relationship (t-statistic = 5.33), 15 in our sample the same sub-sample generates a barely significant relationship (with tstatistic = 1.90). The relationship is not significant for former French and Spanish colonies in columns 2 and 3, respectively. In column 4 the relationship is again significant for former British colonies, but becomes insignificant when the Neo-Europes are dropped from the sub-sample in column 5.
16
For robustness, we run the same regressions using EPAL. We observe a similar set of relationships between population density and log GDP in Table 4 . In the full sample equivalent population density has a negative and significant relationship with log GDP, with similar results for the sub-sample without Africa; however it is not significant in the sub-samples of only Africa and without the Americas. When excluding Neo-Europes it is again weakly significant and is not significant for sub-samples of former French and Spanish colonies, and former British colonies excluding the Neo-Europes.
[Insert Table 4 here]
As with AJR we also estimate the above regressions using population density per kilometre of potential arable land in the year 1000 as an instrument for PAL. Our results, which are available upon request, correspond exactly to the same results we found with the PAL and EPAL variables previously. The relationship is negative and significant for the full sample but not for most of the sub-samples.
Our results in Tables 3-4 thus suggest that the relationship between population density in 1500 and contemporary GDP per capita is not robust.
We can now summarise our findings:
• The relationship between population density and log GDP per capita is negative and significant for the full sample, the sample excluding Africa, and the sample with former British colonies.
• It is weakly significant for the sample of the Americas and the sample excluding the NeoEuropes.
• It is not significant for the sub-samples of Africa, the sample excluding the Americas and the sub-samples of former French, Spanish, and British colonies excluding the NeoEuropes.
• Our results are robust for both the PAL and EPAL variables and are validated by the 2SLS regressions.
Interpretation
In using new population density and urbanization data we find two consistent results. First, the data suggests that the 'Reversal of Fortune' thesis fails to work for African countries, which together comprise a majority of our and AJR's full sample. This finding adds to and corresponds with a long literature on Africa which suggests that the continent was already poor before the advent of formal colonialism in the late 19th century, whether due to low population densities (Austin, 2008a; Green, 2011) , malaria (Bhattacharyya, 2009; Bloom and Sachs, 1998) or ethnic diversity (Birchenall, 2009; Easterly and Levine, 1997) , among other possible factors. It also corresponds to a recent literature suggesting an ambiguous and sometimes positive effect of colonial rule on development in Africa, especially as regards population growth, height and nutrition (Clapham, 2006; Moradi, 2009) . As suggested by (Hopkins, 2009 ), more work on African economic history is thus necessary to help tease out the effects of colonialism on long-term economic growth.
Our second consistent finding is a lack of a reversal among former French and Spanish colonies, accounting for 49% of the sample. While we can explain the former case by the fact that 19 of 23 former French colonies were in Africa, only 2 of 19 former Spanish colonies were outside the Americas. 17 This disparity among colonial powers is not surprising, however, considering the voluminous literature on the different effects of colonial powers on post-colonial economic and political development (Bertocchi and Canova, 2002; Blanton, Mason, and Athow, 2001; Grier, 1999; Lange, Mahoney, and Vom Hau, 2006) . There is some evidence in our results that this disparity is a result of the Neo-Europes, but, as with our results for Africa, this remains a topic for further investigation.
Conclusion
This paper has questioned the empirical analysis of AJR's 'Reversal of Fortune' thesis, specifically as regards their use of both pre-colonial urbanization and population density as proxies for pre-modern income. We found in both cases that alternative and more appropriate measurements of both proxies fail to generate a robust negative relationship between income in 1500 and contemporary GDP per capita with appropriate levels of statistical significance, and in the case of urbanization the coefficient even changes signs to suggest a positive relationship.
With our urbanization data we did not find any strong evidence of the Reversal thesis for either our full sample of countries or any of our sub-samples. With our population density variables our full sample supported the Reversal thesis but several sub-samples did not, namely those that exclude the Americas and include only African countries, former French and Spanish colonies and former British colonies without Neo-Europes. At best these results suggest that a Reversal took place among certain countries, especially in the Neo-Europes; at worst our results suggest a total lack of a Reversal among most countries in our sample.
Our point here is not to suggest that the 'Reversal of Fortune' argument is entirely incorrect.
There exists a great deal of evidence to suggest that India, for instance, had higher wages than many parts of western Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, but that over the next three centuries Indian wages dropped while European wages increased dramatically (Allen, 2005) . Other recent more qualitative work on the subject has agreed with certain aspects of the Reversal hypothesis even though it suggests alternative mechanisms (Bayly, 2008; Lange et al., 2006 
